known (at least in theory) by the legislators at the moment when the law is enacted.
Amar provides no persuasive argument that the term "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation" denotes such a closed class. To make such an argument, he would have to show that sexual orientation is not merely a status, but also an irreversible status, a characteristic that does not change over time and that thereby defines a closed class from which members cannot exit and nonmembers cannot enter. Rather than attempt such an argument, Amar arg ues that Amendment 2 discriminates on the basis of "status" rather than "conduct " and thus "targets persons for who they are, not what they have done. "3 But this status-conduct dis tinction is irrelevant to the issue raised by the Attainder Clauses -the issue of whether Amendment 2 names persons by designating them as a closed class, the entire membership of which could be known by the legislature.
Amar's emphasis on the status-conduct decision is mischievous not merely because it misconstrues the Attainder Clauses but also because the distinction is, in a larger sense, deeply misguided: although the dis tinction repeatedly surfaces in gay rights litigation,4 it is practically triv ial and intellectually incoherent. Indeed, this is why neither the respon dents' brief, nor Professor Tribe's amicus brief, nor-as I shall explain below -the Romer Court relied on such a distinction. Amendment 2 would be a deprivation of equal protection -although not an attainteven if the term "orientation " were omitted from its text. For, as Romer and respondent's brief repeatedly state (and as Amar curiously ignores), the central flaw in Amendment 2 is not its ambiguous and probably severable mention of "orientation" but rather its breadth, its imposition of a "broad and undiff erentiated disability on a single named group,"5 3. Id. at 217. 4. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 64-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993) , revd. en bane, Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Department of De fense's regulations imputing persons on homosexual status, not conduct, were repugnant to common law and constitutional principles); Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1451 , diff erent result reached on rehg., 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990) (holding that the Army's regulations, under which "homosexuality" -not sexual conduct -was the operative trait for disqualifi cation, were unconstitutional because they discriminated against persons of homosexual orientation, a suspect class); Jantz v. Muci, 159 F. Supp. 1543 , 1546 -47, 1551 (D. Kan. 1991 revd., 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992 ) (finding that a governmental classification based on an individual's sexual orientation is inherently suspect, while noting that most courts have found that persons engaging in homosexual conduct do not constitute a sus pect class). As these examples suggest, the status-conduct distinction has not fa red well as a way of vindicating gay rights: at best, it is accepted by lower courts or appellate panels only to be rejected on appeal or en bane.
5. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) .
regardless of whether the group is defined by conduct or orientation. It is the sheer breadth of Amendment 2 that makes it constitutionally sus pect, and not some burden on "orientation" as opposed to "conduct."
In the following pages, I will first attempt to explain the scope and purposes underlying the Constitution's clauses forbidding bills of attain der. Then I will show that the distinction between "orientation" and "conduct" -or "status" and "conduct" -really has nothing whatso ever to do with this principle. Finally, I will try to show that, like re spondent's brief, Romer depends crucially on the breadth of Amend ment 2 -the wide category of antidiscrimination laws that Amendment 2 preempted. It is this breadth, and not any use of the term "orientation" that led the Court to invalidate Amendment 2.
I.
First, let me start where I think that Amar and I agree: What is at tainder, and why is it suspicious?
As Amar notes, at the core of the rules against attainder is the no tion that "[a] law naming persons and singling them out for distinctive treatment is suspicious. "6 The fundamental principle underlying the rule is that the state and federal legislatures must make policy by "generally applicable rule[s]"7 rather than by laws that single out groups or per sons by name -what the Court calls "specifically designated persons or groups. "8 Thus, the most obvious violation of the rule against attain der is a statute that literally designates individuals by their proper names -for instance, a law stating, "Akhil Amar is barred from hold ing public office." Amar is surely correct that the Attainder Clauses would also bar the Congress from using definite descriptions for the same purpose as a proper name: it would equally be unconstitutional for Congress to declare that "all persons who wrote an article entitled Of Sovereignty and Federalism will be barr ed from public office," for the definite description obviously serves the purpose of singling out a spe cific individual and no one else. Moreover, Amar must also be correct that a law can be a bill of attainder if it designates a specific group of persons: so, for instance, a law barr ing "all members of the Amar fam ily" from holding public office would be an attainder just as much as if each member of the family were individually listed in the text of the statute.
6. Amar, supra note 1, at 213 (emphasis added). 7. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965) . 8. 381 U.S. at 447.
From these uncontroversial propositions, Amar makes the in sightful observation that the rule against attainder is actually "a proto type of the Equal Protection Clause: "9 the rule limits the ability of the legislature to single out disfavored groups and thereby prevents depriva tion of equal legal protections. As Amar notes, a law barring "all per sons of East Indian descent " from holding public office would be just as much of an attainder as a law barring "the Amar family " from hold ing public office. For such a law would "specifically designate[] " a group of persons and no one else for disfavored treatment just as much as a law penalizing an entire family.10 Indeed, the analogy between ra cial and familial classifications is extraordinarily close: both are legal relationships defined by lineal descent, ancestry, or blood line.
But Amar's astute analogy between the rule against attainder and the rule against deprivations of equal protection is not just an insight but a warning: there is a danger that the concept of attainder can be come just as murky and incoherent as concepts of equal protection, bogged down in " 'free-form' constitutionalism" which Amar rightly disparages but that has notoriously plagued equal protection law. The problem is that, while the rule against attainder prohibits laws that im pose punishment on "specifically designated persons or groups,"11 we do not really have a clear notion of what it means to "specifically " des ignate something or someone. Of course, proper names are the easiest case.12 But, as we have seen, they are not the only sort of "specificity " that the anti-attainder rule prohibits. Laws that burden "members of the Communist Party " or "former rebels against the United States govern ment " are also too "specific. " But then what exactly is not "too spe cific "? What passes muster as a "generally applicable rule"? As Pro fessor Tribe has noted, "the concept of legislative 'specification' .. . cannot be so broad as to swallow up all laws that impose some disa bling limitation upon an ascertainable group. "13 Could a law impose regulatory burdens on "the catfood industry "? "Fly fishermen "? "Per sons under six feet in height"? Unfortunately, Amar does not provide a criterion for defining ille gal legislative specification -illegal "naming " -beyond stating that laws cannot "target[] persons for who they are " on the basis of their 16. Note that this unchangeability has nothing to do with whether race is somehow "immutable" in any biological sense: race is considered here only as a legal concept, not a biological fact target not merely specific groups of presently existing individuals but also specific groups of fa milies and lines of fa milial descent. It is as if the law contained a list of proper fa milial names rather than individual names. Such a legal burden will be transmitted lineally from parent to child, insuring that the descendants of the legislators' enemies. will be burdened and the children of the legislators' friends will be exempt.
Thus, the prohibition against racial discrimination contained implicitly in the Fourteenth Amendment, as Amar notes, has deep antecedents in Article I's prohibitions ori attainder and titles of nobility and Article ill , section 3 's prohibition on corruption of blood.
Consider also judicial precedent. In determining whether the mem bers of a legislative class are "easily ascertainable" and therefore ille gally specified or "named," the Court asks whether the class's member ship is irreversibly fixed on enactment or whether exit and entry into the class is possible after the law's enactment. For instance, in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 17 the Court held that a federal statute denying educational assistance to stu dents who failed to register for the draft, did not attaint such students because such students could escape the law's burdening simply by reg istering in accordance with the law. By contrast, the Court noted that the laws at issue in Cummings 18 and Garland, 19 barring former Con federate sympathizers from being licensed for various professions, were bills of attainder because they created "absolute barriers" to exit from the class: "no one who had served the Confederacy could possibl [y] comply [with the licensing requirement], fo r his status was irreversi ble. "20 In short, the Attainder Clauses do not necessarily bar legal bur dens based on status per se, but rather classifications based on "irre versible" status -that is, on legally closed classifications with a membership that is, therefore, permanently fixed upon enactment.
What policy might be served by such a rule against closed classes? Amar provides us with the answer: closed classes tear away the "veil of ignorance" that should normally accompany legislation and thus invite corrupt legislative purposes to infect lawmaking.21 Closed classes pierce this veil of ignorance by insuring that the legislators will know the identities of everyone who will ever be burdened by legislation. By us ing these closed classes, a legislator can ensure that a legislative burden will be imposed only on persons that she dislikes and no one else - that the classification will never inadvertently "spill over," as it were, on to political allies. Therefore, legislation containing closed classes en ables legislatures to launch "surgical strikes" against unpopular groups, confident that such burdens will not affect favored constituents upon whom the legislator depends.22
But why require such a veil of ignorance at all? Why must the leg islature be forced through the use of open classes to be minimally im partial? There is a deep constitutional tradition that governmental deci sions cannot rest on a mere desire to impose costs on one person or group for the benefit of another person or group; the identity of the bur dened persons ought to be irrelevant to the purpose of the burden.23
This tradition of minimal impartiality is enforced in some contexts, such as adjudication, through institutional design. For instance, judges have life tenure, are bound by precedent, and are conditioned to limit their own discretion by various forms of professional indoctrination; likewise, ex parte contacts are forbidden; reasons for decisions must be provided on a record; evidence must be presented in a controlled set ting; and so forth.
In the legislative context, however, these sorts of institutional con straints are necessarily missing. The Attainder Clause's prohibition on closed classes preserves a minimal degree of impartiality that is other wise impossible to guarantee in the legislative context through institu tional design. The veil of ignorance in the legislative chambers, in ef fect, replaces the blindfold on the face of Justice in the courtroom, and creates a different sort of blindness that accomplishes the same sort of effect -a minimal degree of impartiality.
II.
In light of this summary of Attainder Clause jurisprudence, it is easy to see why Amar's argument against Amendment 2 based on the Attainder Clause faces some serious obstacles. Quite simply, it is at 22. Note that open classes preserve the veil of ignorance in that, at least in theory, the legislator using such classes can never predict whether or not she or her favored constituents will end up being burdened by the law: legislators who vote for a law re quiring the imprisonment of "embezzlers" or the constituents who support such legisla tors cannot know for sure whether they themselves might not some day end up being indicted under the law. (Impossible? Ask Dan Rostenkowski.) The membership of the class "embezzlers" is not logically fixed by a finite number of names of individuals or fa mily lines when it is enacted into law. Thus, if legislators are forced to forego closed classes, they will have an incentive to moderate their partiality toward themselves and their particular constituent coalition .
23. For a general discussion of this tradition, see CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17-39 (1993).
least unclear that the class contained in Amendment 2 -persons with "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or re lationships " -is a closed class that pierces the legislative veil of ignorance.
Amar emphasizes that Amendment 2 specifically does not cover persons of heterosexual orientation.24 This is true, but, depending on how homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation is defined, it is irr ele vant. For it might be the case that the phrase "homosexual orientation " refers to an inclination, desire, urge, and so on, that anyone in Colorado can have or cease to have at any time, much like a desire to hunt elk, drive red sports cars, smoke, eat junk food, forge checks, cheat on one's spouse, or marry more than one person. That is, "being a gay person " might be like "being a pedestrian" -something that each person be comes some of the time but that no one is all of the time. If homosex ual orientation designates a mutable mental state that might potentially affect any and all persons from time to time -analogous to "adulter ous orientation " or "polygamous orientation" -then the membership of the class covered by Amendment 2 was not fixed when the law was enacted. In theory, the proponents of Amendment 2 themselves could be burdened by Amendment 2, if and when they experienced homosexual orientation.
Perhaps sensing that his interpretation of the term "orientation " in Amendment 2 is tendentious, Amar offers some occasional statements of empirical fact about the nature of sexual orientation. He asserts that "desires, fantasies, thoughts, urges, and drives" are "often" impossible to "prevent or control, "25 and he asserts that "we are not all equally likely tomorrow to wake up and feel gay. "26 At least the second of these statements27 seems to suggest that "homosexual orientation" must denote a closed class; Amar seems to be asserting that, as an empirical matter, one subset of the population has a gay or lesbian orientation and the rest of the population does not. If one looks to the intent of a law's proponents to discern whether a term in a law designates specific groups or persons with a closed class, then it is not obvious that Amendment 2 contains a closed class.
Judging from the statements of the proponents of Amendment 2, the term "homosexual orientation" was not intended to serve as a closed Colo. 1994 ) (Nos. 945A48, 945A128) (arguing that Amendment 2 is necessary to pre serve heterosexual marr iages from the "specter of sexual competition" presented by the possibility of homosexual relationships).
of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual persons " as more like the category of alcoholics or habitual smokers: anyone could fall into, or be re deemed out of, the class.
Given the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, one easily might regard this view of Amendment 2's proponents as empirically ground less.32 However, if bills of attainder are forbidden because they target specific persons, then one arguably should look to the intentions of the ratifiers of Amendment 2 and not some empirical fact about sexual ori entation to determine whether Amendment 2 illegally names any spe cific group. If the ratifiers of Amendment 2 believed that anyone -in cluding themselves -could become gay or lesbian, then such a belief might suggest that they did not have any improper purpose to target a discrete subpart of the population.33
In any case, even if one resolved the issue by·reference to empiri cal evidence concerning human sexuality, it is not obvious that sexual orientation is a fixed trait like, for example, blood type. Quite apart from the proponents of Amendment 2, many advocates of gay and les bian rights maintain that human sexual desire is more fluid than immu There are, however, two problems with using the status-conduct distinction to explain the scope of the Attainder Clauses. First, the dis tinction between status and conduct is simply irrelevant to the Attainder Clauses' meaning. Second, if Amar considers desires and propensities to be a sort of "status," then the distinction between status and conduct is simply a normatively implausible line to draw. large numbers of visible gay men and lesbians in society, the media, and the schools, will have no influence on the sexual identity of the young, are wrong."); Janet E. Hal ley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 529-46 (1994 Much of Amar's reliance on the status-conduct distinction seems to be rooted in a concern that government not criminalize mental states or propensities alone, a concern that Amar finds reflected in Robinson v.
California42 and the "bedrock tenet" that "punishment can occur only after offending conduct: it cannot be a crime simply to be, or merely to think or feel. "43 But Robinson is a precedent interpreting the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments," not Ar ticle I's prohibition on attainder. Unless the concept of attaints is coter minous with the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments," this ar gument is a non sequitur.
Put more generally, however cruel and unusual it might be to pun ish people based on their thoughts alone, why would one think that the Aside from the formal objection that a status-conduct distinction seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with the Attainder Clauses, there is the further practical objection that the distinction seems norma tively groundless -indeed, trivial. Propensities are closely related to intentional conduct: if one wants to affect intentional conduct, then one generally tries to affect propensities. And one way that the government uses to change propensities is to stigmatize them. As Judge Silberman explained in the recent Steffan45 en bane opinion for the D.C. Circuit, if the state legitimately may proscribe same-sex sexual contact as immoral or antisocial or otherwise undesirable, it is not obvious why the govern ment cannot also take measures to stigmatize propensities that tend to lead to the undesirable conduct. 46
Thus, the law routinely imposes stigmatic burdens on persons based on their "character" -another term for propensity. Innumerable state statutes, for instance, require that applicants for occupational li censes for virtually every licensed occupation prove that they have "good moral character."47 And, like any other employer, the govern ment cares deeply about the propensities of its prospective employees.
44. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1979) . Of course, one might argue that such status-based discrimination might survive strict scru tiny. But why should it have to undergo such scrutiny in the first place? Neither text nor precedent suggests that the Eighth Amendment even presumptively prohibits the gov ernment from considering persons' temperament or inclinations -their "status" -in drawing distinctions in civil contexts like public employment.
45. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane).
46. See 41 F.3d at 685-90. 47. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-5-116.2(c) (1991) (law student intern must have "good moral character"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-7-102(2)(c) (1991) (bail bonds man must show that he is a person of "good moral character"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-9-107(21) (1991) (caller or assistant at bingo parlor must be "of good moral char acter"); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-39-106(1) (1991) (applicant for license as nursing For instance, the faculty at any public law school would be predictably interested in the temperament, predilections, and general character of any candidate for a teaching position. If such a candidate sincerely an nounced that she hated to write law review articles, then this revelation of her propensities would surely count against her -regardless of her otherwise stellar prior conduct. This is not to deny that it might be more precise for the laws to operate on the basis of specifically described conduct rather than status.
So, for instance, if a state were to adopt an employment policy docking the pay of public employees who are "smokers " and requiring them to attend seminars on the dangers of tobacco, one might reasonably com plain that the state should instead dock the pay and impose the classes on "people who routinely smoke" -that is, to burden some pattern Qf smoking "conduct " rather than the "status " of being a smoker. But this is surely a distinction without much normative significance because the status of being a smoker manifests itself solely through visible behavior like smoking: the status is just a shorthand for the conduct.
If the Attainder Clauses simply require that the government ex press "status " terms ("smoker " or "gay person") as "conduct " terms ("person who regularly smokes " or "person who regularly engages in homosexual conduct, relationships, or practices"), then the clauses are unusually trivial in their effects. Under this view of the attainder provi sions, Colorado could save Amendment 2 simply by dropping the term "orientation, " or construing it to mean "manifest orientation, " and con tinue to forbid the state from providing protection from discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual conduct, practices, or relationships." It is difficult to see why this would accomplish anything of significance, however, especially given that the Colorado Supreme Court construed the terms "orientation" and "conduct " to "provide[] nothing more than a different way of identifying the same class of persons. "48
At bottom, it is the triviality of the status-conduct distinction that is the strongest objection to the distinction's continuing use in litigation and debate over the rights of gays and lesbians. For gays and lesbians are not interested in merely "being gay " (whatever that means): they are interested in engaging in conduct: making love, forming relation ships, dating, displaying photos of partners in the workplace, wearing wedding rings, living together in rental units, holding hands in public, home administrator must "submit evidence of good moral character"); CoLO. REv.
STAT. § 12-61-103(3) (1991) (real estate broker must have "good moral character").
48. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 , 1349 -50 (Colo. 1994 ), affd., 116 S. Ct 1620 (1996 . and otheiwise expressing desire, aff ection, and commitment. Likewise, the proponents of Amendment 2 and other opponents of what they term "the gay life-style" are not simply interested in persecuting persons for their inner thoughts and desires; they are interested in suppressing any public manifestations of homosexuality through public and private ac tion. To bar the state from burdening gay or lesbian "orientation" while allowing the state to burden gay or lesbian "conduct, practices, and re lationships" is to accomplish nothing of practical significance: it is to give gay and lesbian persons the right to stay silent in the closet -a "right" they already have, as a practical matter. In other words, the breadth of the disabilities imposed by Amendment 2 is at the core of the Court's opinion.
Amar's analysis based on the concept of attaint ignores this p" erva sive language concerning Amendment 2's breadth, for the narrowest at taint is still unconstitutional. A law barring "Akhil Amar" from hold ing the post of town dog catcher would still violate the Attainder
Clauses. Under Amar's analysis, the breadth of Amendment 2 is simply irr elevant, but it was obviously crucial to the Romer Court's analysis.
Contrary to Amar, I think that the Court's discussion of "status based enactment" is best understood as referring not to Amendment 2's reference to "orientation" but rather to this extraordinary breadth.
Amendment 2 was a status-based enactment because the disabilities im posed by it were so broad that they can only be understood as an effort to impose "disfavored legal status." Indeed, the Court uses the terms "disfavored legal status'' and "general hardships" interchangeably when it states that "laws singling out a certain class of citizens for dis favored legal status or general hardships are rare."54 In short, Romer is centrally concerned with Amendment 2's "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities,"55 and not its imposition of burdens based on sexual orien tation as opposed to conduct.
Why might the breadth of Amendment 2 render it unconstitu tional? Amendment 2 was a rather extraordinary law -"unprece dented," in the Court's phrase. What could possibly be the legitimate purpose of such a limit on the state's rulemaking capacity? To encourage police officers, govern-57. Lest one argue that this construction of Amendment 2 is tendentious, keep in mind that, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, the voter education pamphlet, the proponents of Amendment 2, and the state of Colorado, Amendment 2 would have overruled the Governor's Executive Order forbidding discrimination against state em ployees on the basis of sexual orientation. State employees are covered by the state's general rules against arbitrary discrimination: they can be fired only for just cause. If Amendment 2 trumped the Governor's executive order, then mutatis mutandis it trumped any policy that would make specific any general prohibition against arbitrary discrimination by declaring that discrimination against gay and lesbian persons is, in fact, arbitrary. ment supervisors, or building inspectors to violate state law? To keep gay and lesbian persons ignorant of the state-law rights that the state admits gay and lesbian persons retain? If discrimination against gay and lesbian persons is really illegal under state law -because it is deemed to be arbitrary state action by the state civil service commission, for in stance -then surely the state ought to be able to say so.
It seems to me that the Romer Court simply held that such a blan ket prohibition on protective policies can only be motivated by animos ity toward the persons stripped of protection and not any legitimate governmental purpose. Remember the minimal duty of impartiality: no law can impose burdens on persons based solely on those persons' identity -on the fact that the burden of a law is felt by A rather than B. Put another way, a legislative classification must do more than de fine the group that is burdened: it must also justi fy the burden imposed.
The breadth of Amendment 2's burdens defies justification except as an expression of generalized hostility toward gay and lesbian per sons. By the State's own admission, discrimination on the basis of ho mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation or conduct might be arbitrary some of the time. Amendment 2, however, inexplicably precluded rules and policies that specifically remedies such discrimination all of the time -even in contexts where sexual orientation was completely irrel evant to the State's own legitimate interests.
Perhaps such a broad exclusion of rules and policies might have been justified as a prophylactic rule if there were some indication that a narrower policy might not accomplish the aims of the State. But the State never offered the Court any such prophylactic justification for why Amendment 2 should paint :with such a broad brush, and it is hard to imagine such a rationale. As the Romer Court noted, the remarkable aspect of Amendment 2 was its imposition of "general hardships" on persons. Whether those persons are defined by conduct or status, impo sition of such "undifferentiated" disabilities "is not within our constitu tional tradition": such "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities"58 seems so gratuitous that it can only be explained as "a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. "59 Such a theory of Romer based on the breadth of Amendment 2's burdens requires more explanation than · space permits in this forum. In particular, it requires one to answer Justice Scalia's charge that, under Salerno, one cannot strike down Amendment 2 based on its unconstitu-58. Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1628. 59. 116 S. Ct at 1628. tional breadth in the context of a facial challenge.60 However, such a breadth-based theory better explains both the Romer Court's decision and the unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 than the theory proposed by Professor Amar based on the Attainder Clauses. And, incidentally, it is precisely such a "rational basis" based on the breadth of Amendment 2's burdens that plaintiff-respondents pressed in their brief filed with the Court.
60. See 116 S. Ct. at 1632.
